The nineties in Spain: too much flexibility in the youth labour market? by García-Pérez, J. Ignacio & Muñoz-Bullón, Fernando
 
Working Paper #03-03 (02) 
Business Economics Series  
January 2003 
 
Sección de Organización de Empresas de Getafe 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 




THE NINETIES IN SPAIN: TOO MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN THE YOUTH 
LABOUR MARKET?* 
 
J. Ignacio García-Pérez1 and Fernando Muñoz-Bullón2 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines movements into and out of employment in the Spanish youth 
labour market throughout the nineties. We analyze how differences in personal and 
economic circumstances influence such movements. In addition, we consider the 
importance of duration dependence in determining them. Our main findings are that: (i) 
Very young workers, women and those with lower qualification levels are more likely 
to be affected by high labour turnover; (ii) The existence of unobserved heterogeneity 
has important consequences in the unemployment hazard rate; (iii) In the 90's, 
employment hazard rates were substantially affected by the extensive use of fixed-term 
contracts, although the 1997 labour market reform seems to have reduced this hazard 
rate; (iv) The intervention of temporary help agencies has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of leaving unemployment, although only for short-term unemployed 
individuals; at the same time, however, the employment hazard rate is substantially 
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1 Introduction
The Spanish labour market has traditionally been perceived as a very rigid
one for two principal reasons. Firstly, unemployment rates are persistent
at very high levels: whilst unemployment increases in recessions, it does
not reduce su¢ciently in periods of economic growth. Secondly, the length
of time that an individual tends to be unemployed for is also very long.
Subsequently, the proportion of long–term unemployment has become more
important, even in periods of intense economic growth. For instance, from
1987 to 1991, around 57.4 percent of those who were unemployed in Spain
were so for more than one year. Throughout the nineties, this percentage
has been around 52.7 percent.
In spite of this, we may wonder if the Spanish labour market is, indeed,
so rigid. In 1984, the Spanish government implemented a huge liberalization
of employment protection regulation by allowing the extensive use of …xed-
term or temporary labour contracts. Following this reform, employment in
Spain has grown principally due to temporary contracts (they represent more
than 90% of new hires). In the nineties, the proportion of temporary workers
has always remained above 30%, the highest level in Europe. Moreover, the
duration of these temporary contracts has typically been very short. In
1999, more than 58% of the total number of temporary contracts were for
less than one year (31% were for less than one month). These facts are
totally at odds with the previous impression of a rigid labour market.
In order to investigate the degree of ‡exibility in the Spanish labour
market, it is essential to study how many individuals are changing their sit-
uation at a given moment1. This paper focuses upon this issue by examining
mobility patterns in Spain over the last decade. In particular, we investi-
gate the determinants of employment and unemployment hazard rates, using
a sample of over 19,000 individuals a¢liated to the Social Security system.
This sample consists of the whole labour history of workers who were, at the
end of 1995, either employed through a Temporary Help Agency (THA) or
non-employed in this month. Hence, given that these agencies hires mainly
young workers (83.6% of the labour contracts signed by THAs were with
workers under 35 years-old), the data set is only representative of young
workers in the Spanish labour market. Thus, our analysis is intended to
provide information on mobility rates for young individuals over a long time
period (1990 to 1999). These individuals constitute a group of much con-
cern for policy in Spain, given that 59.19% of the unemployed and 80.81% of
1Such an analysis is of considerable importance, because the existence of high rates of
unemployment in Spain may be hiding important in‡ows and out‡ows from unemployment
to employment. See, for instance, García–Pérez (1997).
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temporary contracts belonged to workers under 40 years-old in this period.
We use duration models applied to a longitudinal data set on individ-
uals’ work history by taking into account the e¤ects of both duration and
individual heterogeneity in the hazard or exit rates. Our estimation tech-
nique allows us to take account of concurrent events via time–dependent
variables, similar to the ones used in Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002)
and García–Pérez (1997). In addition, given that some variables which may
a¤ect both employment and unemployment duration (e.g., family income,
skills or unemployment bene…ts) are unobserved in our data set, it becomes
necessary to control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. The use
of Social Security records presents certain advantages for the analysis of
turnover with respect to other sources of information2. Firstly, it collects
information on all jobs held. Secondly, it allows us to determine employ-
ment and non–employment durations precisely. Di¤erent statistical sources
have also been used to study the determinants of employment transitions;
in particular, we can mention the use of the 1985 Encuesta de Condiciones
de Vida y Trabajo by Alba–Ramirez (1991), Andrés et al. (1989), Sánchez
Moreno and Peraita (1996) or García–Serrano and Malo (1996), and the use
of the Spanish Labour Force Survey by Toharia (1996, 1997), and Bover et
al. (2002). With regards to ‡exibility, we can conclude from these studies
that, during the time-periods analyzed, there has been an increase in in‡ows
and out‡ows between unemployment and employment.
However, to our knowledge, there is no research on mobility patterns in
Spain for the period 1990–99, where we observe two moments of equal ex-
pansion, 1990 and 1997, and a big depression in the middle, 1993. This time
period is also of considerable importance, since, throughout the nineties,
the observed bad functioning of …xed-term contracts, along with the un-
employment rate —at over 20 percent of the labour force— triggered the
implementation of two main labour market reforms in 1994 and 1997.3 The
1994 reform put forward speci…c limits on the use of …xed–term contracts:
the minimum and maximum duration of temporary contracts for young peo-
ple were changed to 6 months and 2 years, respectively. It also extended
the subsidies and incentives to promote the conversion of …xed–term con-
tracts into permanent ones which were introduced in 1992. The 1997 reform
implemented again new measures that attempted to rectify the excessive
precariousness present after 1984: more subsidies to promote the transi-
tion from temporary to permanent contracts were agreed upon and a new
typology of permanent contract with lower …ring costs targeted at “pro-
tected categories” of workers —young people under 30 years–old, long–term
2A di¤erent extraction from Social Security records was previously used to study em-
ployment and unemployment spells through the use of duration models in García–Fontes
and Hopenhayn (1996) and García–Pérez (1997).
3See, for example, Güell and Petrongolo (2000) or Segura(2001) for a deep description
of these reforms.
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unemployed, people above 45 years–old and disabled individuals— was in-
troduced. Given this new institutional context, we consider the analysis of
both in‡ows and out‡ows from employment in this decade essential in the as-
sessment of whether di¤erent mobility patterns. In particular, we make use
of well-known econometric models for duration analysis in order to evaluate
these Government policy changes that have occurred along the nineties.
From our results we …nd that the exit rates from both employment and
unemployment are very high. This leads us to the conclusion that there has
been a high level of ‡exibility in the Spanish youth labour market through-
out the 90’s. The use of …xed-term labour contracts is widespread. More-
over, very few of these contracts are renewed as permanent ones, which
leads again to the persistence of turnover rates, especially for very young,
low quali…ed individuals and during recession periods. These facts are likely
to be the reasons why the exit rate from employment presents a very im-
portant peak exactly at the thirty-sixth month, the maximum duration of a
…xed-term contract in Spain. We have also obtained evidence that supports
the argument that the 1997 labour market reform reduced the high turnover
rates observed in the central years of this decade. From information on the
type of contract held by individuals, we are able to conclude that the new
type of permanent contract introduced with the 1997 reform has substan-
tially improved the probability of …nding and maintaining employment.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we summarize the factors un-
derlying the duration of both employment and unemployment spells. Sec-
ondly, we show the econometric models for duration analysis that we use
in our estimations. We then describe the data in detail and subsequently
present the empirical results. The last section o¤ers our conclusions.
2 Framework of analysis
2.1 The duration of unemployment spells
The theoretical analysis of unemployment duration is based on job search
models (see extensive surveys in Mortensen, 1986 or Devine and Kiefer,
1991). The basic outcome of these models is the unemployment hazard
rate. This hazard rate is the product of the probability ®(t) of receiving
a job o¤er and the probability that the non–working individual will accept
the o¤er. The latter is the probability that the arriving wage o¤er is higher
than a critical value, called the reservation wage, wR(t).
The job o¤er probability, ®(t); is a function of both the level of demand
and the search activity of job seekers. In this sense, an individual’s level of
quali…cation can be expected to have a positive e¤ect on ®(t); a negative
impact of age is expected as well. As regards the intensity of search, it is
evident that it must have a positive impact on ®(t). Finally, employment
demand conditions —measured either through the unemployment rate or
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through the number of vacancies— may be having some in‡uence on ®(t)
in the sense that the better those conditions are, the higher the expected
job o¤er probability. Apart from these main e¤ects, we can expect this o¤er
arrival rate to vary with the duration of the unemployment spell. Di¤erent
theoretical models predict a negative duration-dependence of this arrival
rate based, for instance, on human capital depreciation or stigma e¤ects
appearing as unemployment lengthens.4
The other component of the unemployment hazard rate is the acceptance
probability which is equal to the probability that the o¤ered wage is equal or
higher than the reservation wage. Therefore, any variable which increases (or
reduces) the reservation wage will reduce (or increase) the job acceptance
probability and, in addition, will reduce (or increase) the probability of
exiting from unemployment, given all other things equal. Hence, the e¤ect
of variables that increase income while unemployed, for example the receipt
of unemployment bene…ts, will clearly raise the reservation wage, reducing
the unemployment hazard rate.
Finally, as well as the arrival rate, and in part because of it, the reser-
vation wage is also a function of unemployment duration. For instance, the
amount of unemployment bene…ts received is not constant along time, but
depends on its duration; moreover, search intensity may be attenuated as
unemployment goes on. All these factors make the reservation wage de-
crease with unemployment duration. But this also causes the acceptance
probability to increase and, hence, no clear prediction arises for the e¤ect
of unemployment duration on the unemployment hazard rate. However,
available empirical evidence indicates that, in general, the net e¤ect is nega-
tive5 or positive at the beginning of the unemployment spell and decreasing
afterwards (See García-Pérez, 1997, 2001b).
2.2 The duration of employment spells
The duration of employment spells has usually been analyzed using the
models of e¢cient labour turnover developed by Jovanovic (1979a,b). These
are incomplete information models in which (i) workers’ abilities are not fully
known at hiring; (ii) the employer would like to produce at a desired level
but deviation from this level is acceptable so long as it does not fall below
a minimum threshold; and (iii) the …rm monitors workers until su¢cient
information is collected in order to make a judgement with the acceptable
degree of accuracy. In this context of incomplete information, the actual
contract goes on as long as the individual’s expected productivity keeps
above a threshold …ring level (called the reservation productivity). Thus,
the hazard rate out of employment is equal to the probability that this
expected productivity falls below the reservation productivity.
4See, for instance, Vishwanath (1989) or Pissarides (1992).
5See Narendranatham et al. (1985), and Nickell (1979).
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Jovanovic’s model was designed for homogeneous workers. However,
when estimating the hazard rate from employment, we must take into ac-
count the observed di¤erences among workers. Those di¤erences may be due
to both individual or job position characteristics. With respect to the for-
mer ones, workers with the most valued features for the …rm will have longer
employment spells. Secondly, some job position characteristics (such as the
required quali…cation level for the job) may a¤ect the employment hazard
rates: a higher quali…cation can be associated to longer tenure in the …rm if
employers consider that workers complying with higher quali…cation levels
are more ‡exible and have a higher ability of adaptation; In addition, the
reservation productivity de…ned for worker–…rm matching may also depend
on the economic cycle and on local labour market conditions.
Once we have taken into account the fact that di¤erent individuals have
di¤erent probabilities of exiting from employment (i.e., the heterogeneity ef-
fect), we must also consider the possibility that these probabilities depend
on the actual length of the employment spell (i.e., the duration e¤ect). Ac-
cording to Jovanovic’s model (1979b) the likelihood of job ending is expected
to be shorter the longer the duration of the spell; the reason being that those
individuals who are “good matches” dedicate less time to …nd alternative
o¤ers and are less likely to accept any such potential o¤er. In addition, we
would also expect that, the longer the spell, the more important the invest-
ments in speci…c human capital will be; the greater the speci…city of this
investment, the more likely the continuation of the worker–…rm match in
the future will be, so that the employment hazard rate diminishes. Another
important factor is that the longer the employment spell, the higher the
…ring costs. Hence the …rm will have less incentives to get rid of the worker.
3 Duration analysis: econometric proceedings
In order to study the hazard rate for both employment and unemployment
spells, a discrete-time duration model will be used. The estimation technique
is similar to the one exploited in the works of Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993), Sueyoshi (1995), Jenkins (1995), García–Pérez (1997) and Bover et
al. (2002). The reason for using discrete–time techniques is not only that
data are observed in discrete intervals (namely, in months) but also that
these techniques are much more ‡exible for estimating the time–dependence
of the hazard rate (see Meyer, 1990).
Moreover, the technique used in this paper helps us to circumvent the
usual assumption of proportionality between the e¤ects of duration and
other covariates over the hazard rate. There are cases in which the impact
of explanatory variables changes with duration in a determined state (for
example, in our case, the e¤ect of having been a THA-worker over the exit
rate from unemployment may not be the same for the short as for the long-
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term unemployed). Because of this, it becomes necessary to model the
hazard rate in a non-proportional way and, for this purpose, discrete time
helps considerably.
Therefore, our hazard rate will be the following conditional probability:
µ(t) = Pr(T = tjT ¸ t) (1)
where, given that we are modelling a dichotomous variable, we can con-
sider its dependence on duration and other explanatory variables through
a known distribution function. As in other papers, for example García-
Pérez (1997) or Bover et al. (2002), we will use the logistic distribution.
Hence, considering the duration in employment and unemployment states
as our discrete random variables, and taking also into account the e¤ect of
personal characteristics, our two conditional exit rates will be as follows:
µ(t) = F (µ0(t) + µ1(t)x(t)) (2)
where x(t) is a vector of personal characteristics —which do not vary over
time— and of aggregated characteristics which do vary over time t; µ0(t) is
the additive term of the duration-dependence in the hazard rates that we
will estimate in the most general way; and µ1(t) represents the coe¢cients
for the explanatory variables which in general depend on duration —that is,
interactions between these variables and duration are allowed for.
Due to the absence in our data set of important determinants of both
hazards —some of them being, e.g., family income, characteristics of the
job and whether or not the individual is receiving unemployment bene…ts—
and, given the known result of unobserved heterogeneity generating spu-
rious duration-dependence in the hazard rate (see, for example, Flinn &
Heckman, 1982), it becomes necessary to control for this problem. Hence,
in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, our hazard rates will have the
following form:
µ(t; ´) = F (µ0(t) + µ1(t)x(t) + ´) (3)
We do not wish to impose more structure upon our estimation. Thus, we
will follow a semi-parametric approach based on Heckman and Singer (1984)
where we are assuming that unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete
distribution function with di¤erent mass points. In particular, our results
are based on a two–mass–point distribution function.6
6 In addition, an alternative estimation with three di¤erent mass points was undertaken;
however, one of them always converges to zero. Therefore, we believe that the distribution
function with two mass points properly accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity in our
data.
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The estimation technique of the model is maximum likelihood. Given the
likelihood contribution of each individual i in the sample, Li(´); 7 conditional
on ´, we obtain that with unobserved heterogeneity, ´; the log-likelihood







where F (´) is the cumulative distribution function of ´; which is a discrete
function with two mass points, ´1 and ´2: These mass points are selected
in order to verify the assumption of E(´) = 0 which is necessary given the
presence of a constant term in the hazard rates. Besides, it is estimated the
probability p for the variable ´ to be equal to its value ´1: Hence, we will
estimate all the parameters of the hazard rates, along with p and ´1:
4 Data
The data source are work histories of a sample of 19,778 individuals collected
from administrative data belonging to Social Security records. It includes in-
formation on all individuals’ employment (and non-employment) spells from
1990 to 1999 of a sample of mainly young workers.8 In fact, our data set is
only representative of young workers in the Spanish labour market. In par-
ticular, workers from 20 to 35 years-old account for 49% of the total sample,
while, according to the Labour Force Survey, those individuals represented
32% of the active population in Spain at the end of 1995. Therefore, our
estimates can not be generalized to provide insights about the overall level
of job mobility in the economy. On the contrary, our analysis is intended to
provide information on mobility rates for young individuals over a ten-year
period, who constitute a group of much concern for policy in the Spanish
labour market.
The work history data provided includes information about worker age
and gender, professional category of the worker contribution to the Social
Security9, dates at which employment spells start and end, type of Social
7See García-Pérez (1997) or Bover et al. (2002) for an expression of this likelihood
function.
8This is due to the way the sample were obtained. It was selected 10.000 workers hired
through a Temporary Help Agency (THA) at the end of 1995 and the same number of
individuals who were non-employed at this same date.
9We must underscore that the eleven professional categories of worker contribution to
the Social Security in the database do not reveal the workers’ level of quali…cation, but
rather the required level of quali…cation for the job. For instance, an individual working in
the lowest category, “peón”, may well be in possession of an academic degree. In any case,
we will refer to contribution categories from here onwards as “quali…cation”, although
this remark should be taken into account for the subsequent analysis. As in previous
studies using data from the Social Security records, we group those eleven categories in
four groups from maximum to minimum quali…cation required for the job.
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Security system for the worker, the reasons for the termination of the spell
(voluntary quit, dismissal or retirement), the Spanish province where the
employment spell took place, an identi…er indicating whether or not each
employment spell is accomplished through a THA, another one if it is ac-
complished through a public …rm, and, …nally, the type of contract held by
the worker (temporary or permanent). We eliminate incomplete records,
and also spells of individuals above 52 years-old in order to avoid the bias
that early retirement programs may create in both exit rates, and keep only
workers a¢liated to the General System (Régimen General) so as to avoid
the bias in the estimations that special systems like Agriculture, Fisheries,
and so on would provoke. In addition, given that mobility patterns arising
from quits are likely to substantially di¤er from involuntary separations, in
order to achieve greater homogeneity, we also eliminate records destroyed for
reasons other than dismissals or end of contracts.10 Finally, given that we
want to use information about the following employer in each employment
or unemployment spells, we keep only individuals with at least two observed
employment spells11.
Our database contains an important number of individuals presenting
subsequent employment spells through the same …rm, with particularly short
unemployment spells in-between these jobs. Evidence for this is shown in
Table 1. This table shows average employment and unemployment durations
for individuals who present no subsequent spells through the same …rm, and
for individuals who, on the contrary, have from two to twelve consecutive
spells through the same employer along their work history. Average employ-
ment duration for the former equals 199.43 days. On the contrary, for those
workers with the same employer in the following spell, the average employ-
ment duration is just 76.07 days. Moreover, job durations reduce quickly as
the number of spells through the same employer increases (from an average
duration of 136 days with only two spells with the same …rm to less than 16
days when the number of consecutive spells is 12). Something similar occurs
for unemployment spells: while the average stay in unemployment for those
individuals who have no spell through the same …rm in their work history
is 71.37 days, the average duration of these unemployment spells reduces
as the number of unemployment spells in-between employment spells with
10 In this database we cannot distinguish between these two di¤erent reasons for termi-
nation of the spell and, therefore, we consider both as involuntary turnover. Moreover,
we will not consider voluntary turnover. As both reasons of terminating the employment
spell are totally di¤erent, we think they have to be studied separately. Hence, future
research will compare the results in this paper to the results arising from an analysis of
the subsample of records ending in quits.
11Given that the data set is mainly constituted by young workers, the percentage of
individuals who do not hold at least two employment spells is insigni…cant. That is, when
we keep individuals for whom only a single spell of employment is observed, the …nal
sample is very similar to the one …nally used in the analysis. Statistics are available from
the authors upon request.
8
the same …rm increases (so that on average, individuals who do have spells
through the same …rm only su¤er on average 20.71 days in unemployment).
Therefore, the more likely the individual is to be employed through the same
employer, the shorter the intermediate unemployment spells he must con-
front with. This fact is re‡ecting the new hiring policies adopted by …rms
which consist on using intensively very short temporary contracts in order
to avoid uncertainty and also, of course, to reduce labour costs.
Given this high turnover rate observed in our data —with mainly short
unemployment spells— and in order to avoid estimating transitions between
two di¤erent employment spells without passing through a real state of un-
employment, we decided not to use either unemployment and employment
experiences shorter than 15 days.12 The basic change these spells provoke
over the employment hazard rate is that this is much higher at duration 1.
In addition, estimations implemented with these spells show no special dif-
ferences compared to the ones presented here. The only remarkable change
is that the THA e¤ect over the hazard rate becomes even stronger, given
that many short–term jobs are implemented through these …rms.
As regards employment spells, our sample consists of 49,322 spells13,
whose characteristics can be observed in Table 2. Our sample of estimation
is composed mainly of relatively young males, with a reduced quali…cation
level, and with very short durations in employment (indeed, more than half
of the observations in our database present durations of less than 3 months).
Given that there is a very small number of observations for long durations
(>46 months) and in order to avoid noise in the results, we have consid-
ered these observations as arti…cially right-censored, that is, as employment
spells that do not …nish in the observed period. This is the reason why there
are no observations with employment durations beyond 46 months. In ad-
dition, there are individuals who continued being employed at the moment
in which the data were downloaded (December 1999); these observations
are also right–censored, because their spell was not complete at that mo-
ment. However, most of jobs (95.75%) terminate during the sample period.
As opposed to the sub-sample of non–THA individuals, workers who …nd
employment through these intermediaries are more likely to be younger, fe-
male and to be in possession of a reduced quali…cation level. In addition,
THA workers enjoy shorter employment durations than non–THA individ-
uals (the average tenure is 3.65 months, as opposed to 6.09 months for
non–THA workers).
12 It is unknown whether very short spells are either true unemployment spells or just
represent a delay in registering the worker at the Administration after a job–to–job move-
ment.
13This is a sub–sample of the initial sample (of 180,010 records); it was necessary to take
this random sample due to the techniques of estimation implemented. In the estimation,
each (non)employment spell is broken down into so many monthly observations as the
duration of the corresponding spell (See Jenkins, 1995).
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We have a sample of 34,137 unemployment spells. Their main character-
istics can be observed in Table 3. For the same reason as in the employment
analysis, we consider unemployment durations beyond 30 months and the
ones that have not …nished before December 1999 as right-censored unem-
ployment experiences. Again, in this sample of unemployment records, men
are the majority; most of observations show low quali…cation levels; young
individuals (under 25 years–old) represent almost half of the total sample
size, and only 15.42 percent of complete unemployment experiences lasted
beyond 6 months. As regards THA individuals when compared to non–THA
ones, we …nd that agency workers are more likely to be younger, in posses-
sion of reduced quali…cation levels and to have shorter unemployment spells
(the average stay in unemployment is of 2.81 months for agency workers,
but 4.29 months for non–THA individuals).
Given the estimation technique used, which consists of breaking down
the event into monthly observations in which the individual is at risk of
failure in employment or unemployment (see Jenkins, 1995), the …nal length
of the database on employment and unemployment is of 311,156 and 146,071
registers, respectively.
5 Estimation results
As explained in the previous section, a discrete-time duration model will be
estimated for both employment and unemployment spells using a sample of
Spanish workers. The estimation results will be …rstly presented based on
the model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Then, these re-
sults will be compared to the ones obtained when controlling for the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity in both hazard rates.
The speci…cation of the hazard rates will be the following. Apart from
the variables on individual and job characteristics, the business cycle and lo-
cal economic conditions (which collect the observed heterogeneity e¤ect), the
duration-dependence has been taken into account through the inclusion of a
polynomial in log(t). In addition, dummy variables indicating whether or not
the individual is on–the–job in his sixth, twelfth, eighteenth, twenty–fourth,
thirtieth or thirty–sixth month have been included in the employment haz-
ard rate. We do this because, as explained below, evidence indicates that
the likelihood of exiting from employment is signi…cantly higher in these
months. Finally, interactions between duration (in employment or unem-
ployment) and some of the explanatory variables have also been speci…ed14.
14The …nal speci…cation of the estimated models only presents the interactions that are
obtained to be signi…cant. The initial speci…cation included all the possible interactions
between duration and the explanatory variables. Moreover, the shown polynomials in
log(t) are the ones which obtain the best results in terms of signi…cance and likelihood
values.
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5.1 Hazard rate from employment
Let us …rst examine the e¤ect of employment duration on the likelihood of
exiting from the job. Monthly Kaplan–Meier estimates for the total sample
are plotted in Figure 1. This empirical hazard function collects the propor-
tion of individuals leaving employment at each moment in time, given that
they have been employed until that moment (Lancaster, 1990).
As can be observed, this hazard rate is declining with employment du-
ration, so that the probability of job ending declines with tenure on the job.
The exit rate is clearly very high early in the job, reaching 32.62% in the
…rst month; it falls to 5.61% at the end of the …rst year, and then remains at
around 3% from then on. However, the most interesting result in Figure 1 is
the fact that the hazard rate actually rises to peaks in months 6 (32.34%),
12 (19.07%), 18 (12.27%), 24 (16.70%), 30 (12.46%) and 36 (32.47%). These
peaks show that job contracts are very likely to …nish at each of these par-
ticular months. This fact can be explained, basically, by the extensive use
of …xed-term contracts which are usually for these speci…c durations.
In Table 4, we present the results of the maximum likelihood estimation
of the hazard rate out of employment assuming a logistic distribution for F
(equation 3), under the two assumptions of no unobserved heterogeneity and
a two–mass–point distribution function for this heterogeneity. As expected
from the shape of the empirical hazard rate previously presented, tenure on
the job presents a negative impact on the exit rate. That is, individuals who
have been employed for longer are less likely to exit from the job. Moreover,
the dummies describing employment durations which are multiples of six
(i.e., durations of 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months) present a positive and
very signi…cant e¤ect on the hazard rate. Since in this database it is not
possible to distinguish as a reason for termination of the spell, between the
end of a temporary contract and a dismissal, and, given that no special
reason can be adduced to explain why individuals should be dismissed at
those months multiple of six, we can then deduce that the positive e¤ect
of these dummy variables must be very likely due to temporary contract
terminations. These e¤ects can be quali…ed by taking into account these
dummies’ interactions with some of the factors collecting the heterogeneity
e¤ect. Hence, for instance, we obtain that higher rates of economic growth
reduce the likelihood of exiting from employment at those peak months,
presumably re‡ecting that better economic conditions encourage the signing
of permanent contracts (instead of temporary contracts). Moreover, younger
individuals and those not working in public …rms are the most likely to su¤er
from contract termination at those months.
Let us examine the e¤ects of other factors (apart from the actual du-
ration of the spell) on the likelihood of exiting from employment. We will
begin by considering the e¤ect of individual’s job position. The …rst result
is that those individuals who are working through a THA are more likely to
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experiment shorter employment spells15. This THA e¤ect can be observed
in Figure 2, where it can be noted that THA workers also show stronger
peak-month e¤ects. These results are sensible when considering both the
demand and supply–side motivations for addressing to THAs16. From the
demand–side, those intermediaries are often used as a “bu¤er” for client
…rms in order to meet changes in the product demand in a context where
…rms are reluctant to hire permanent sta¤ until the economic outlook be-
comes more stable. From the supply–side, workers addressing to THAs often
appreciate the limited work hours or the greater ‡exibility in scheduling that
can typically be found in these …rms. Therefore, THA workers are expected
to show shorter durations in employment (see Table 2).
In Table 5, we have the predicted average durations in employment for
di¤erent groups of individuals distinguishing between their age, sex and
quali…cation level. We can see that the whole sample’s predicted employ-
ment duration is 6.35 months and that this predicted duration is much larger
for no-THA workers. However, we …nd that both male and female skilled
workers with less than 25 years of age present larger expected employment
durations under THAs. Hence, it seems that THAs could be doing a good
job with very young skilled workers.
A positive impact on the employment hazard rate appears when the
employer in the following employment spell is the same as the present
one (so-called equal employer). One of the reasons why individuals who
are contracted by the same employer are more likely to enter into unem-
ployment might be due to the hiring policy adopted by …rms; the latter
may resort to former employees in order to …ll vacancies. Thus, employers
may be temporarily …ring workers —with whom they have no permanent
commitments— during periods of low demand or in order to avoid having to
pay fringe bene…ts (such as, for instance, holiday pay); then, once two weeks
have passed after the …ring decision, those same former workers are then ac-
tually rehired. Finally, a positive impact on the hazard is also obtained
when the individual has been employed through a public …rm, although the
impact is lower as experience in the job lengthens.
With respect to the e¤ects of worker’s characteristics on the probability
of leaving employment, at the beginning of the employment spell, men are
less likely to exit from employment than their female counterparts, although
this di¤erential gender impact is reversed the longer the duration of the spell.
The employment hazard rate is higher for the young (people under 26
years–old). They also show substantially higher exit rates especially at peak-
months. This result presumably indicates lower …rm costs when laying o¤
these workers, given the temporary nature of many of the contracts that
15There might exist selection by workers into THAs. This bias can be taken into account
by jointly estimating a process for the decision of whether or not to work for a THA. This
analysis is being undertaken by the authors in a companion paper.
16See Muñoz–Bullón, 2002.
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they hold. Finally, as expected, very low levels of quali…cation increase
substantially the probability of exiting employment (see Figure 3).
The e¤ect of economic conditions on the probability of entering into
unemployment is showed in Figure 4. This …gure plots the combined e¤ect
of the local unemployment rate and that of the GDP growth rate at the
moments where the GDP attains its maximum and minimum values for our
10–year period of observation; the average values of unemployment rates are
also taken into account at the two extreme cyclical points. The employment
hazard rate is counter-cyclical only for short employment spells, those of
less than 5 months. This result makes sense, since, when things are getting
worse, …rms are dismissing workers whose on–the–job experience is shorter.
Finally, we have included two additional dummies in our estimation to
allow for the speci…c impact of three distinctive periods throughout the
nineties. In order to capture the potential e¤ect of the two labour market
reforms in this decade, we make distinctions between the spells observed
before 1995, then those between 1995 and 1996 —that is, under the e¤ect of
the 1994 reform— and, …nally, those spells from 1997 onwards —which may
show a di¤erent behavior on the hazard rate as a result of the 1997 labour
market reform. Net of the business cycle e¤ect, we …nd that both periods
show higher employment hazard rates than those at the beginning of the
nineties. However, the e¤ect changes with tenure and with the impact of
individual variables. As regards tenure, for both the period from 1995-1996
and the period after 1997, this positive e¤ect is reduced the longer tenures
are. Hazard rates in both periods are also reduced the higher the GDP
growth rates are. As regards the impact of individual variables, the high
employment hazard rates obtained for the period 1995-96 are even larger
for the low-quali…ed youngest individuals (under 36 years-old) and for those
working through a public …rm. As for the speci…c e¤ect of the period 1997-
onwards, the hazard is specially higher for low quali…ed individuals and those
above 36 years-old. This e¤ect may well show the reduction of turnover for
young people after the 1997 labour market reform. The complete e¤ect of
these two dummies can be better understood in Figure 5. The employment
hazard rate is the highest in the period 1995-1996. Initially, the estimated
hazard rate for 1990-94 is the lowest one; however, note that for tenure on
the job above nine months, the lowest hazard rates are always obtained for
the period 1997-99. We may, therefore, conclude that, in spite of the fact
that …ring rates increased after the 1994 reform, they were inferior to their
initial levels after the implementation of the 1997 reform. In addition, the
especially high …ring rates characteristic of peak–months clearly decreased
from 1997 onwards.17 While exercising caution with these dummies —which
might be in‡uenced by other potential e¤ects— it seems that the labour
17Of course, we have no data for employment spells larger than 24 months in the period
1997-1999, so the estimations for the duration dependence after that month are obtained
solely with the spells terminated before 1996.
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market reform in 1997 slightly reduced the large turnover rates characteristic
of the mid-nineties.18
In Table 5 we observed that the average employment durations predicted
by our estimation are much lower after the 1994 labour market reform but
they recovered a bit after the 1997 one. In fact all age groups of skilled
males and very young skilled women were the mostly bene…ciated by this
labour market reform.
The last two columns of Table 4 show the estimation of a similar spec-
i…cation for the employment hazard rate but, this time, controlling for the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity. We obtain no evidence in favor of the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in our data. Although the likelihood
function is a bit higher when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we
estimate almost one point in its distribution function (its value is not sig-
ni…cant and has a probability of 0.9925). Hence, we can conclude that the
employment hazard rate may be accurately estimated without taking into
account the control for unobserved heterogeneity.
5.2 Hazard rate from unemployment
Empirical hazard rates from unemployment are shown in Figure 6. As pre-
viously outlined, the maximum duration is of 30 months due to the scarcity
of observations beyond this duration. The hazard rate begins an increas-
ing trend from the very beginning of the unemployment experience, reaching
levels above 35 percent for the second month.19 However, it falls very quickly
until the eighth month, then shows another peak at the tenth month, and,
from then on, remains at levels slightly above 5 percent.
Table 6 collects the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the
unemployment hazard rate assuming a logistic distribution for F (equation
3). As before, we …rstly present the duration-dependence of the hazard
rate in a polynomial for the logarithm of unemployment duration, and with
interaction terms between the remainder explanatory variables and unem-
ployment duration. In particular, the additive term of the hazard rate col-
lects a fourth–grade polynomial which replicates quite well the form of the
empirical hazard rates.
Let us examine the e¤ect of di¤erent factors on the likelihood of exiting
from unemployment. We shall begin by considering the e¤ects of worker
characteristics. Although the gender e¤ect is attenuated as length in un-
employment increases, women are expected to su¤er longer durations in
unemployment; this gender e¤ect may be justi…ed by recognizing that, in
18We will later present a di¤erent estimation with a sub-sample of workers who gave
information about the type of contract held on the job in order to investigate more about
the new contracts introduced in this reform.
19The smaller hazard rate at one month is simply a consequence of obviating unemploy-
ment spells shorter than 14 days.
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spite of the fact that the participation of women in the labour force has
been increasing from the 80’s on, it is still basically men who support their
families. If this is the case, then, women —specially those with a working
spouse— may presumably be less likely to accept job o¤ers (See Ahn and
García-Pérez, 2002). As regards quali…cation, it is the individuals in the
lowest group who are the least likely to exit from unemployment, while the
ones in the Medium-Low group are the most likely, followed by the most
quali…ed workers. Finally, workers in the medium age range (from 26 to 35
years–old) are the ones who confront the shortest expected unemployment
durations, though at a decreasing rate.
As regards the e¤ect of individual job position on the probability of leav-
ing unemployment, having worked through a THA in the last employment
experience represents a positive impact on the hazard rate, although the
impact is attenuated as unemployment lengthens. Why do previous em-
ployment experiences through THAs represent an opportunity for quickly
leaving unemployment? There are at least two explanations for this result.
Firstly, it could be that these intermediaries provide workers a better connec-
tion to the labour force and, thus, greater access to information. Secondly,
positions covered by client …rms through THAs are typically “assessment
positions” in which performance is visible to a number of higher–level per-
sons in the organization and in which performance largely determines future
career mobility; therefore, these observations and skill development charac-
teristics of the THA positions increase the probability that capable people
will be engaged in permanent positions20. It makes sense then that those
individuals who stay unemployed for longer after a THA employment ex-
perience become less attractive for potential employers (they may emit a
negative signal to the latter). These e¤ects are re‡ected in Figure 7 where
we …nd that the positive impact of having worked through a THA is only
present for those unemployed for less than four months.
In Table 7 we present the corresponding predicted unemployment dura-
tions deduced from our estimations. Mean unemployment duration is 3.08
months being a bit larger this duration for no-THA workers. However, it
seems that skilled workers previously working through THAs su¤er longer
unemployment spells than no-THA ones. Hence, although they are more
time in the job (remember Table 5), once they are unemployed, if they
do not exit quickly from this state, they could be sending a bad signal to
employers, thus having longer unemployment spells.
Experience in the previous employment positively a¤ects the probability
of exiting from unemployment, though at a decreasing rate. This result
indicates that longer previous labour experiences raise the probability of
receiving a job o¤er, especially at the beginning of the unemployment spell,
20As Muñoz–Bullón (2002) indicates, hiring THA workers to monitor them and then to
o¤er permanent positions only to those who perform well seems to have become a common
strategy of employers.
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in spite of the fact that longer experiences are likely to be correlated with
higher unemployment bene…ts, which will probably reduce the likelihood
of accepting any job o¤er. Finally, if the …rm that hires the unemployed
worker is the same as in the previous job, equal employer, the probability
of exiting from unemployment is much greater. This “recall” phenomenon
previously described is common in the labour market transitions re‡ected
in our empirical analysis. In addition, those individuals who have been
previously employed by a public …rm are more likely to stay for longer in
unemployment.
As regards the e¤ect of economic conditions, the unemployment hazard
rate is clearly pro-cyclical: higher levels of national economic activity show
a positive e¤ect on the likelihood of exiting from unemployment. The com-
bined e¤ect of the provincial unemployment rates and the GDP growth rate
are shown in Figure 8 where we show the predicted hazard rate evaluated
at the moments of maximum and minimum GDP growth along with the
average values of unemployment rates at those two extreme cyclical points.
Finally, and as in the case of the employment hazard rate, we have in-
cluded two dummies in our unemployment estimation to allow for the spe-
ci…c impact of three di¤erent periods during the nineties: 1990-94, 1995-96,
1997-99. Net of the business cycle e¤ect, the impact of the dummies indi-
cates that the e¤ect of the two labour market reforms is positive. Therefore
the likelihood of exiting from unemployment is higher in the second half
than in the …rst half of the nineties. However, the e¤ect changes when we
take into consideration unemployment duration and the impact of individual
variables. The di¤erential impact of the period 1995-96 increases the longer
the unemployment spell is; a contrary impact of unemployment duration is
obtained for the period 1997-99. The complete e¤ect of these two dummies
can be better understood in Figure 9 where we can see that the probability
of leaving unemployment is maximum after 1997 only for those who stayed
unemployed for less than 3 months. The e¤ects of GDP growth rate is not so
pro-cyclical in the periods 1995-96 and 1997-onwards. As regards the impact
of individual variables, the e¤ects of those two periods are also attenuated
for individuals in the Medium-Low quali…cation group; on the contrary, the
impact is larger for the youngest (under 25 years-old). As for speci…c e¤ects,
we …nd that the impact of the 1995-96 period is lower for individuals who
have been previously employed for longer and if they have worked through
a THA. As regards the 1997-99 period, the e¤ect is increased for men and
is reduced if they …nd employment with the same previous employer.
In Table 6, we can see that average unemployment duration clearly re-
duced after the 1994 reform, specially for very young skilled workers. After
the 1997 reform, the average unemployment duration reduced a bit more but
only for unskilled workers under 25 years old and also for women between
26 and 35 years old.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity calls for an adequate control,
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especially due to the absence of important determinants of the unemploy-
ment hazard rate: apart from information about the household and the
labour market in which the unemployed worker is searching, the receipt
of unemployment bene…ts is another important variable missing from our
data.21 In order to control for this problem, we will use the same technique
as before: we will assume that unobserved heterogeneity can be summarized
by a discrete two–mass–point distribution function.
Results from this estimation are shown in the last two columns of Table
5. The estimated distribution function shows the existence of two di¤erent
types of workers: with 22.56 percent probability, there exists a group of
workers with a much higher unemployment hazard rate. The two estimated
types, in terms of hazard rates, are shown in Figure 10. Even though it
is not possible to identify which speci…c characteristics lead to this result,
unemployment bene…ts are likely to represent an important determinant.
The e¤ects of unobserved heterogeneity over the remainder estimated pa-
rameters are not very relevant since the estimated coe¢cients remain very
similar. The only remarkable di¤erence is that under the control of unob-
served heterogeneity, the duration-dependence of the unemployment hazard
rate is less negative.
To sum up, medium–aged workers, males, relatively quali…ed workers
and those working through a Temporary Help Agency —although the latter
only for very short durations in unemployment— enjoy higher chances of
exiting from unemployment. Moreover, given the previous result of contra-
cyclical employment hazard rates for short employment durations, we can
o¤er an explanation for the strong growth of the unemployment rate in the
last recession period of the Spanish economy: the extension of job destruc-
tion, specially of short-term jobs, coupled with a very low exit rate from
unemployment in recession years make up two important factors for the
sharp increase in this aggregate …gure.
6 Conclusion
The present paper has provided a basis for assessing the employment mo-
bility patterns throughout the youth Spanish labour market in the nineties,
a decade so far characterized by the lack of information about these labour
market outcomes. We have set out the empirical results for the determinants
of employment and unemployment exit rates compiled from a representative
sample of over 19,000 individuals a¢liated to Social Security. The time-span
of our analysis is of considerable importance, since the limits imposed during
21 In spite of this lack of information as regards this variable, given that the proportion
of young workers that we have in our database is very high (as we will see below), and
that these individuals are less likely to be entitled to unemployment bene…ts, given their
shorter accumulated tenure. We think this lack of information is not so serious. In any
case, we have no means of contrasting this hypothesis.
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the 90’s on the use of …xed–term contracts might have changed the picture
of transitions patterns sustained through previous empirical studies.
Our principal …nding is that employment and unemployment hazard
rates are much higher in the 90’s than in the 80’s. In other words, throughout
the nineties, the Spanish labour market has been even more ‡exible than
in the eighties. Temporary work through …xed–term contracts rather than
permanent employment is responsive for these high turnover rates.
Within this overall picture of the labour market, there are many …ner ad-
ditional results which are encountered with our empirical analysis. Firstly,
we …nd that the probability of exiting from employment is negatively a¤ected
by job tenure and is largely determined by the duration of …xed–term con-
tracts. Moreover, those with relatively low quali…cation levels and younger
women working through THAs are more likely to become unemployed. Sec-
ondly, we …nd that a long duration of unemployment reduces the likelihood
of …nding a job, even when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. In
addition, this hazard rate di¤ers according to the individuals considered:
middle-aged men who have a intermediate quali…cation level and are at the
beginning of their unemployment spells are the most likely to re-enter em-
ployment. Finally, and not surprisingly, the better the general economic
conditions, the more successful individuals are in leaving unemployment.
We …nd that the existence of certain employment practices are also high-
lighted by our results. For instance, employers are frequently resorting to
layo¤s and recalls. These are arrangements whereby workers are required to
stop working for a temporary period —during which unemployment bene-
…ts could be received— and after which they are re-employed by the same
…rm. In addition, the practice of hiring workers through private employment
agencies seems to imply a trade–o¤ for the employee: For although this form
of intermediated work implies enhanced opportunities of employment, these
workers are only recruited for very short periods of time.
Finally, in spite of the fact that turnover rates in the nineties are excep-
tionally high, some evidence is found to support the idea that the Govern-
ment measures of 1997 —intended to tighten regulations governing tempo-
rary work— have had some in‡uence on labour mobility patterns. For, the
likelihood of exiting from employment has reduced since 1997, and is partic-
ularly lower in the months when temporary contracts …nish when compared
to the years 1990-1994 and 1995-1996. But at the same time, the likelihood
of exiting from unemployment is comparatively higher from the year 1997
onwards when compared to the …rst decade of the nineties, although this is
only true for very short unemployment durations.
Additional evidence on the e¤ect of this labour market reform can be
deduced from Table 8. This table shows (both for the employment and the
unemployment hazard rates) the odds–ratios of the impact of four variables
related to the type of employment contract held, namely: permanent con-
tracts, part-time contracts, the new, post-1997, permanent contracts, and
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others resulting from the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent
ones.22 The most important results from this table are as follows.23 With
regard to the employment hazard rate, those individuals in possession of a
permanent contract enjoy a 60.33% lower probability of losing their job. Fur-
thermore, those holding a part–time contract su¤er a 41.12% higher proba-
bility of exiting from employment than those holding a full-time temporary
contract. With regard to the unemployment hazard rate, those individuals
who had held a permanent or part–time contract prior to their being un-
employed …nd it comparatively more di¢cult to …nd a new job. Conversely,
the unemployed who have previously been contracted through the new 1997
permanent contracts show a 53.91% lower employment hazard rate at the
same time that it is found a much higher probability of leaving unemploy-
ment. Hence, we think this is evidence showing that workers with these
new permanent contracts have largely escaped the e¤ects of high turnover
rates in the nineties and they also maintain better chances of quickly leav-
ing unemployment. Finally, we …nd no clear evidence on the e¤ect of the
conversion of …xed-term contracts into permanent ones over both hazard
rates. Hence, we can conclude that the principal bene…t of the 1997 reform
comes from the introduction of the new permanent contract. Whether this
is due to the reduction in …ring costs or the important subsidies received by
employers is a question that remains as yet unanswered.24
22See the introduction for a more detailed explanation of this reform.
23The size of each subsample is lower due to the fact that some observations lack infor-
mation regarding contract type.
24We have estimated a speci…c model for only permanent workers, distinguishing those
with the new 1997 permanent contract from those under the former one. We …nd clear
evidence that, under the new contract, the employment hazard rate is much lower than
for those with the old permanent contract in the …rst year of tenure. Hence, we think that
it is not only the subsidies both contracts are receiving. It seems that the reduction in
…ring costs could be under the fact that …rms are changing their …ring decisions early in
the job given its associated cost is lower under the new permanent contract.
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Table 1
Employment and unemployment duration by spells with the
same …rm (in days)















Main sample characteristics for employment duration analysis
Total Sample THA workers No-THA workers
Total % Total % Total %
Total 49,322 13,614 35,708
Censored 2,098 4.25 98 0.72 2,000 5.60
Gender: Male 30,113 61.05 7,489 55.01 22,624 63.36
Equal employer 15,759 31.95 7,177 52.72 8,582 24.03
High Qual. 1,931 3.92 336 2.47 1,595 4.47
Med.–High Qual. 5,074 10.29 1,012 7.43 4,062 11.38
Med.–Low Qual. 17,792 36.07 5,154 37.86 12,638 35.39
Low Qual. 24,525 49.72 7,112 52.24 17,413 48.76
Age 16–25 16,955 34.38 5,557 40.82 11,398 31.92
Age 26–35 20,085 40.72 4,747 34.87 15,338 42.95
Age 36–52 12,282 24.90 3,310 24.31 8,972 25.13
Duration (months)¤:
1-3 26,360 55.82 9,448 69.90 16,912 50.17
3-6 10,822 22.92 2,419 17.90 8,403 24.93
6-12 5,670 12.01 960 7.10 4,710 13.97
12-24 2,923 6.19 508 3.76 2,415 7.16
24-36 1,197 2.53 146 1.08 1,051 3.12
36-46 252 0.53 252 0.53 252 0.53
Statistics¤:
Average Duration 5.39 3.65 6.09
Median Duration 3 2 3
*Without taking into account censored observations
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Table 3
Main sample characteristics for unemployment duration analysis
Total Sample THA workers No-THA workers
Total % Total % Total %
Total 34,137 13,033 21,104
Censored 714 2.09 250 1.92 464 2.20
Gender: Male 18,642 54.61 6,421 49.27 12,221 57.91
Equal employer 16,994 49.78 8,432 64.70 8,562 40.57
High Qual. 1,022 2.99 81 0.62 941 4.46
Med.–High Qual. 2,987 8.75 751 5.76 2,236 10.60
Med.–Low Qual. 12,602 36.92 5,136 39.41 7,466 35.38
Low Qual. 17,526 51.34 7,065 54.21 10,461 49.57
Age 16–25 16,483 48.28 7,080 54.32 9,403 44.56
Age 26–35 11,102 32.52 3,673 28.18 7,429 35.20
Age 36–52 6,552 19.19 2,280 17.49 4,272 20.24
Duration (months)¤:
1-3 23,629 70.70 10,316 80.70 13,313 64.50
3-6 4,640 13.88 1,396 10.92 3,244 15.72
6-12 3,527 10.55 738 5.77 2,789 13.51
12-24 1,356 4.06 288 2.25 1,068 5.17
24-30 271 0.81 45 0.35 226 1.09
Statistics¤:
Average Duration 3.73 2.81 4.29
Median Duration 2 2 2
*Without taking into account censored observations
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Table 4
Logit Regression for Employment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coe¢cient t-statistic Coe¢cient t-statistic
Log(t) -2.0714 -27.59 -2.0835 -27.63
Log(t)2 1.8568 17.69 1.8682 17.75
Log(t)3 -.80704 -16.36 -.81238 -16.41
Log(t)4 .1100 15.23 .1111 15.31
THA .5238 33.96 .53513 31.75
Gender -.1130 -5.78 -.1126 -5.75
Gender*Log(t) .0910 8.02 .0908 7.93
High Qual. -.7432 -11.52 -.7358 -11.33
High Qual.*Log(t) .1389 5.18 .1315 4.81
Med.-High Qual. -.2531 -6.40 -.2476 -6.20
Med.-High Qual.*Log(t) -.0250 -1.39 -.0297 -1.62
Med.-Low Qual. -.0893 -4.50 -.09024 -4.48
Age 26-35 -.1165 -5.67 -.1167 -5.66
Age 26-35*Log(t) .0728 5.81 .0717 5.67
Age 36-52 .0431 1.24 .0485 1.37
Equal employer .5217 42.35 .5267 40.26
Public …rm .4157 11.48 .4153 11.38
Public …rm*Log(t) -.0567 -2.90 -.0544 -2.73
GDP growth rate -.0982 -10.69 -.0982 -10.65
GDP growth rate*Log(t) .0766 14.78 .0774 14.84
Unemployment rate .0211 14.18 .0211 14.12
Unempl. rate*Log(t) -.0042 -4.36 -.0039 -4.04
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Table 4 (cont.)
Logit regression for employment hazard rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Duration dependence Coe¢cient t-statistic Coe¢cient t-statistic
Period 6 1.7613 38.83 1.7644 38.75
Period 6*GDP growth rate -0.0642 -4.49 -0.0646 -4.51
Period 6*Age 26–35 -0.1528 -3.70 -0.1527 -3.69
Period 6*Age 36-52 -0.2591 -5.37 -0.2602 -5.38
Period 6*Public Firm -0.2423 -3.81 -0.2437 -3.82
Period 12 1.5491 12.67 1.5537 12.69
Period 12*GDP growth rate -0.1206 -5.37 -0.1210 -5.38
Period 12*Unempl. rate 0.0154 3.02 0.0154 3.00
Period 12*Age 26–35 -0.3069 -4.45 -0.3073 -4.45
Period 12*Age 36–52 -0.4872 -5.55 -0.4899 -5.57
Period 12*Public Firm -0.2371 -2.09 -0.2355 -2.07
Period 18 1.7466 18.73 1.7482 18.73
Period 18*GDP growth rate -0.1007 -3.16 -0.1009 -3.16
Period 18*Age 26–35 -0.2452 -2.36 -0.3073 -4.45
Period 18*Age 36–52 -0.4057 -2.93 -0.4091 -2.95
Period 18*Public Firm -0.6004 -2.86 -0.5947 -2.83
Period 24 1.9985 10.38 1.9916 10.32
Period 24*Unempl. rate 0.0196 2.34 0.0200 2.37
Period 24*Age 26–35 -0.5578 -4.92 -0.5612 -4.94
Period 24*Age 36–52 -1.1895 -6.86 -1.1963 -6.88
Period 24*Public Firm -0.7390 -3.27 -0.7310 -3.23
Period 30 2.4294 18.97 2.4275 18.91
Period 30*GDP growth rate -0.2447 -5.42 -0.2473 -5.38
Period 30*Age 26–35 -0.6408 -4.13 -0.6468 -4.15
Period 30*Age 36–52 -0.9256 -3.99 -0.9334 -4.01
Period 30*Public Firm -0.7533 -2.19 -0.7438 -2.16
Period 36 2.5423 9.85 2.5341 9.72
Period 36*Unempl. rate 0.0542 4.89 0.0551 4.92
Period 36*Age 26–35 -0.8963 -6.14 -0.9172 -6.21
Period 36*Age 36–52 -1.1409 -5.48 -1.1613 -5.52
Period 36*Public Firm -1.9360 -5.78 -1.9311 -5.74
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Table 4 (Cont.)
Logit Regression for Employment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coe¢cient t-statistic Coe¢cient t-statistic
period 1995-1996 .6835 13.01 .6777 12.81
* Log(t) -.1532 -10.59 -.1494 -9.80
* GDP growth rate -.0883 -4.66 -.0883 -4.63
* High Qual. -.1154 -1.75 -.1250 -1.86
* Med.- High Qual. -.1925 -4.44 -.1987 -4.49
* Med.- Low Qual. -.0806 -2.90 -.0798 -2.83
* Age 36-52 -.0710 -1.84 -.0796 -2.01
* Public …rm .0667 1.56 .0764 1.74
period 1997-1999 .8307 12.27 .8361 12.28
* Log(t) -.2813 -16.99 -.2814 -16.86
* GDP growth rate -.0695 -3.66 -.0723 -3.78
* High Qual. -.0905 -1.33 -.0944 -1.37
* Med.- High Qual. -.2777 -6.11 -.2811 -6.10
* Med.- Low Qual. -.1012 -3.44 -.1016 -3.41
* Age 26-35 .0241 0.80 .0252 0.83
* Age 36-52 .0703 1.64 .0654 1.50
* Sex -.0778 -3.08 -.0779 -3.06
* Public …rm .1772 4.17 .1828 4.23




Log Likelihood -115,284.7 -115281.81
Size 311,156 311,156
Notes: Reference category is: Female, non–THA worker, Low quali…-
cation, Age 16–25, Non-equal employer, Private Employer, Fourth Quarter,
Years 1990-94.
The coe¢cients for the interactions between duration dummies and
other explanatory variables are not presented for space considerations.
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Table 5
Predicted Employment Average Duration for di¤erent Individual
Groups (in months)
Avg. THA no-THA 1990-94 1995-96 1997-99
Full Sample 6.35 3.50 7.14 7.19 5.63 5.72
Men
Age 16-25
Unskilled 5.43 2.51 6.32 6.06 4.62 4.80
Skilled 7.87 9.80 7.44 9.15 5.71 7.32
Age 26-35
Unskilled 6.41 2.70 7.08 6.73 5.73 6.02
Skilled 11.52 11.34 11.55 12.22 9.63 11.30
Age 36-52
Unskilled 5.31 2.67 6.04 6.54 5.16 5.06
Skilled 11.01 9.07 11.43 12.15 9.65 11.89
Women
Age 16-25
Unskilled 5.39 2.90 6.27 6.34 4.63 4.01
Skilled 7.52 8.64 7.18 8.34 5.05 8.36
Age 26-35
Unskilled 5.95 3.12 6.82 6.60 5.31 5.29
Skilled 5.93 3.14 6.95 6.64 5.34 5.32
Age 36-52
Unskilled 4.31 2.51 5.21 6.49 4.69 3.32
Skilled 8.81 8.50 8.91 9.99 8.48 8.68
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Table 6
Logit Regression for Unemployment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coe¢cient t-statistic Coe¢cient t-statistic
Log(t) 2.2687 24.93 2.6735 20.78
Log(t)2 -3.4392 -23.49 -3.4868 -22.37
Log(t)3 1.5429 20.10 1.5234 19.04
Log(t)4 -.2265 -18.05 -.2222 -17.13
THA .6550 14.53 .7492 13.66
THA*Log(t) -.3259 -17.40 -.3559 -16.91
Gender .1062 4.723 .1256 4.84
Gender*Log(t) -.0269 -1.80 -.0327 -2.06
High Qual. .0381 0.937 .0491 1.08
Med.-High Qual. .0145 0.481 .0158 0.47
Med.-Low Qual. .1550 6.06 .1712 5.84
Age 26-35 .4949 15.67 .5652 14.55
Age 26-35*Log(t) -.0794 -4.58 -.0918 -4.89
Age 36-52 .4581 8.27 .5213 8.12
Age 36-52*Log(t) -.1558 -6.87 -.1682 -6.96
Employment Duration .0153 7.08 .0174 7.04
Empl. Durat*Log(t) -.0069 -4.85 -.0073 -4.84
Equal Employer .8726 51.03 .9845 32.84
Public …rm -.4214 -9.546 -.4969 -9.36
Public …rm*Log(t) .0840 3.206 .0964 3.41
Unemployment rate -.0194 -6.25 -.0210 -5.93
GDP growth rate .0497 4.16 .0610 4.38
GDP growth rate*Log(t) .0172 2.19 .0162 1.93
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Table 6 (cont.)
Logit Regression for Unemployment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coe¢cient t-statistic Coe¢cient t-statistic
period 1995-1996 1.2126 12.23 1.4379 12.01
* Log(t) .1334 5.51 .1259 4.77
* THA -.3907 -8.03 -.4448 -8.02
* Age 26-35 -.3235 -9.02 -.3636 -8.90
* Age 36-52 -.2438 -4.10 -.2740 -4.08
* Med-High Qual. -.0707 -1.40 -.0705 -1.26
* Med-Low Qual. -.0744 -2.19 -.0745 -1.96
* Empl. Durat. -.0003 -4.33 -.0004 -4.37
* GDP growth rate -.1186 -4.92 -.1584 -5.63
* Unemploym. rate -.0114 -3.75 -.0130 -3.79
period 1997-1999 2.0714 18.97 2.3310 17.79
* Log(t) -.2171 -8.07 -.2540 -8.42
* THA -.1350 -2.64 -.1515 -2.66
* Gender .1634 5.27 .1725 5.06
* Age 26-35 -.5220 -12.83 -.5796 -12.54
* Age 36-52 -.4356 -7.21 -.4840 -7.09
* Med-Low Qual. -.0744 -2.04 -.0861 -2.12
* Public Firm .1413 2.79 .1696 3.00
* Equal Employer -.2485 -7.76 -.2908 -8.04
* Unemploym. rate -.0215 -7.10 -.0235 -6.90
* GDP growth rate -.2368 -8.31 -.2620 -8.36




Log Likelihood -69,211.994 -69,203.179
Size 146,071 146,071
Notes: Reference category is: Female, non–THA worker,
Low quali…cation, Age 16–25, Non-equal employer, Madrid, Fourth quarter
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Table 7
Predicted Unemployment Average Duration for di¤erent
Individual Groups (in months)
Avg. THA no-THA 1990-94 1995-96 1997-99
Full Sample 3.08 2.72 3.21 4.97 2.31 2.06
Men
Age 16-25
Unskilled 3.69 2.89 3.99 6.27 2.37 1.79
Skilled 4.73 6.27 4.53 8.38 1.57 3.06
Age 26-35
Unskilled 2.51 2.13 2.64 3.02 2.13 2.21
Skilled 3.12 2.96 3.14 4.24 1.94 2.46
Age 36-52
Unskilled 2.41 2.51 2.37 4.05 1.97 2.46
Skilled 8.09 11.32 6.88 7.67 7.23 8.63
Women
Age 16-25
Unskilled 3.43 3.20 3.53 6.07 2.19 1.74
Skilled 4.45 4.34 4.45 6.91 2.05 2.78
Age 26-35
Unskilled 3.21 3.07 3.26 4.17 2.88 2.79
Skilled 3.29 3.35 3.27 4.17 3.01 2.38
Age 36-52
Unskilled 2.92 2.76 3.03 4.05 2.65 2.85
Skilled 5.34 5.99 5.04 6.81 3.62 6.22
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Table 8
Estimations for the Sub-samples with Information on Type of
Contracts
Employment Hazard Unemployment Hazard
Variables Odds Ratio t-statistic Odds Ratio t-statistic
Permanent contract .3967 -23.35 .8374 -2.26
Part-time contract 1.4117 16.65 .8998 -4.35
New permanent contract .4609 -7.29 1.5637 1.31
Change to perm. contract .7510 -2.19 .9952 -0.01
Log Likelihood -52,636.562 -31,401.992
Size 148,347 62,895
Notes: Reference category is: Female, non–THA worker, Low
quali…cation, Age 16–29, Non-equal employer, Fourth quarter.
The rest of regressors are omitted for space consideration.
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